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I. Introduction 
Long-term care is at the core of a new wave of reforms of publicly financed health care and social 
care programmes. The population of developed nations is ageing rapidly, with a growing fraction of 
the population above age 85 – the ages at which demands for long-term care are highest. This is the 
 
*Keywords: long-term care, health systems, caregiving. 
JEL classification number: I18. 
   
 
 
case in many European countries and in the United States as well as in a number of Asian countries 
such as Japan and Korea. Without reform, the public financing of long-term care is expected to keep 
expanding for reasons beyond the ageing of the world’s population. There is increased female labour 
market participation, reducing the supply of informal caregivers.1 There is growing dependence on 
long-term care to provide post-acute care following a hospital stay. Households want greater public 
funding because of the high cost, which also affects household savings. The challenge for govern-
ments is to figure out how best to fund and organise the public long-term care system to ensure that 
the provisions are efficient and equitable.  
This special issue includes six papers that contribute to our understanding of how best to design the 
public funding and organisation of long-term care systems. Specifically, this issue draws on studies 
containing empirical evidence and clear policy lessons from several countries (England, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the United States). The issue can be divided in three sections. Section II 
examines how long-term care should be funded. Section III investigates how public funding of long-
term care affects savings and access. Section IV examines the organisation of health and long-term 
care, and specifically the role of provider incentives in the organisation of service delivery and hospi-
tal discharges of patients to social care. Section V concludes. 
II. How should long-term care be funded? 
The first two papers in the special issue examine the financing of long-term care and address two 
important policy questions. The first one refers to the sustainability of public long-term care financ-
ing. Bram Wouterse and Bert Smid examine the case of one of the older long-term care systems in 
Europe, that of the Netherlands. Specifically, they consider four financing alternatives: the introduc-
tion of a pay-as-you-go system, a savings fund, a pensioner tax, and a system based on cohort-
specific savings. They show that public financing instruments leading to higher redistribution tend to 
be more costly. More generally, the paper illustrates the type of equity and efficiency trade-offs that 
typically should be considered in deciding how best to finance long-term care. 
Next, the issue considers the indirect costs of a system based on the subsidisation of informal care. 
Johannes Geyer, Peter Haan and Thorben Korfhage revisit the extent to which public subsidisation of 
informal care is indeed a less costly alternative. They specifically examine the effect on family care-
givers who give up work to provide informal care in Germany. They find that informal caregiving 
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leads to sizeable indirect fiscal effects related to forgone tax revenues. Their estimates suggest that 
forgone tax revenues from reduced labour market participation are about 7.2 per cent of the aver-
age fiscal costs of long-term care. Hence, the paper suggests that projections of long-term care fi-
nancing should consider such additional costs to the taxpayer.  
III. What are the effects of public long-term care funding? 
The public funding of long-term care might have a non-neutral effect on a household’s behaviour 
and, more generally, on access to long-term care for individuals in need. The third contribution in 
this special issue empirically tests the commonly held view that a system that publicly finances long-
term care can alter traditional precautionary saving motivations. Joan Costa-Font and Cristina Vi-
laplana-Prieto draw on the introduction in Spain of a universal long-term care funding scheme that 
replaced a previously means-tested system in 2007 and which funds both cash support and in-kind 
care. Importantly, they find a reduction in personal savings that is driven primarily by a reduction of 
precautionary savings among younger old-aged individuals who receive cash benefits (unconditional 
caregiving allowance) only. They find no effects when services are provided in kind. Specifically, they 
estimate a savings decline ranging between 13 and 39 per cent of the cash allowance. The policy im-
plications suggest that conditional rather than unconditional cash allowances should be employed in 
designing public long-term care systems.  
The fourth paper discusses the effect of public funding on equity in the access to long-term care, 
drawing on evidence from European countries. Vincenzo Carrieri, Cinzia Di Novi and Cristina Elisa 
Orso examine the distribution of the provision of home care services across three macro areas in 
Europe. They find evidence of higher inequities in the use of unskilled home care in areas where 
public financing of long-term care is relatively low (‘Southern Europe’) than in areas where the pub-
lic–private mix of financing is more balanced (‘Continental Europe’). Hence, their results are con-
sistent with the view that limited public funding of long-term care can give rise to larger inequalities 
in access to such care.  
   
 
 
IV. How important are the incentives in the organisation of health and 
long-term care providers? 
A final section of the special issue examines the incentives in the organisation of long-term care sys-
tems. Specifically, the last two contributions consider the incentives for long-term care providers to 
deliver long-term care efficiently and for health care providers not to delay discharges from hospital. 
The organisation of long-term care providers typically involves both for-profit and not-for-profit 
agents, and it is important to understand whether the strategies of both types of providers are com-
parable in terms of efficiency. Hyunjee Kim and Edward C. Norton explore whether for-profit home 
health agencies respond differently from non-profit agencies to financial incentives embedded in the 
Medicare prospective payment system in the United States. This question is important because 
some state government regulations encourage for-profit agencies, and certain Medicare policies can 
be manipulated to increase profits without commensurate improvement in quality. The authors find 
that for-profit agencies were more responsive to financial incentives, and therefore contributed dis-
proportionately to the increase in Medicare home health spending under the prospective payment 
system.  
James Gaughan, Hugh Gravelle and Luigi Siciliani investigate whether delayed discharges of patients 
from hospital, commonly known as bed-blocking, vary by hospital type. They find that hospitals in 
England with Foundation Trust status, which gives them greater financial autonomy and flexibility, 
have fewer delayed discharges. Mental Health Trusts have more delayed discharges than Acute 
Trusts but a smaller proportion of them are attributed to the National Health Service (NHS), possibly 
indicating a relative lack of adequate community care for mental health patients. 
V. Conclusion  
The design of the funding and organisation of long-term care systems is a policy-relevant issue in 
most western countries. This special issue has shown that there are trade-offs in the design of fi-
nancing instruments that governments can employ and in the hidden costs of subsidising informal 
care; that public funding can affect saving behaviour (under cash subsidies) and the equity of access 
to services; and the importance both of for-profit motives in service delivery and of the degree of 
hospital autonomy in incentivising early discharges.  
We hope that the lessons from these six important and timely studies help governments improve 
their policies towards long-term care financing and organisation. 
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